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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case raises issues of first impression in Idaho concerning the scope and 
availability of enforcement options for parties to a Trust and Estate Dispute 
Resolution Act ("TEDRA") Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement"). 1 In its simplest 
terms, the disposition of this case will determine what remedies party to a TEDRA 
Agreement can seek when the other party breaches the agreement. 2 
In this matter, the district court chose simply to dismiss the action brought 
Donald Frizzell ("Frizzell"), a beneficiary of the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell 
Family Trust ("Trust"), in its entirety based solely on the allegations in Frizzell's 
complaint. The ruling left Frizzell with no remedy. While vaguely referencing the 
TEDRA statute's "petition" language, the district court determined that Frizzell's 
complaint concerning the TEDRA Agreement was not an appropriate "petition" as 
determined by the statute. Armed with the its plenary power and a statute that 
expressly provides "full power and authority to proceed with such administration 
and settlement [ of a Trust dispute] in any manner and way that the court sees right 
1 Idaho has adopted the same TEDRA statutory provisions as the State of Washington. Washington also does not 
have a case on point. 
2 Frizzell disagrees with the De Youngs' contention that the ruling on this case will "create confusing and/or 
unintended precedent," as the circumstances facing the parties to this Agreement are unlikely to be unique. 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 1, fn. 1). 
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and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and settled 
by the Court," the district court dismissed Frizzell's complaint based on a narrow 
reading of the statute and a construction of the TEDRA Agreement that ignored 
clear limitation language and remedies. LC.§ 15-8-102(2). 
As a matter of law and policy, this Court should overturn the district court's 
ruling and permit Frizzell to seek enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement under the 
broad terms of the TEDRA statute and the remedies available under the Agreement 
itself.3 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT MUST APPLY ADE NOVO STANDARD OF 
REVIEW. 
A district court's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) shall be 
reviewed de novo. Coalition for Agriculture's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 
142, 369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016) (italics in original). 
Similarly, the Court "exercises free review" over issues of law decided by 
the district courts. State v. Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 277, 
3 The parties do not dispute the relevant facts or procedural history in this matter. (Respondents' Brief, p. 1 ). They do 
dispute the scope of the TEDRA Agreement's release and the district court's ruling. For those reasons, Frizzell will 
not provide a restatement of the facts or the procedural poster of underlying the case as they have been fully briefed 
by both parties. 
2 
311 P. 3d 286, 289 (2013) ("Slane"). The interpretation of unambiguous contracts 
or statues is a question of law subject to such free review. Idaho Wool Growers 
Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716, 302 P .3d 341, 345 (2012). 
Despite the clear case law, the De Youngs contend that because the TEDRA 
statute grants district courts broad discretion to administer trusts, this Court should 
"apply an abuse of discretion standard to the [district] court's decision regarding 
the appropriate procedures for resolving trust disputes." (Respondents' Brief, p. 4). 
Neither the case law regarding LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) nor the case law regarding 
appellate review of issues of law supports a review based on "abuse of discretion." 
This Court must apply a de novo standard of review in this matter. 
B. FRIZZELL'S COMPLAINT IS AN APPROPRIATE METHOD 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT. 
1. Frizzell's complaint was a petition to the district court to 
enforce the TEDRA Agreement. 
The TEDRA statute grants the district court "full and ample power and 
authority under this chapter to administer and settle ... trust and trust matters." LC. 
§ 15-8-102(1 )(b ). If the TEDRA statute is silent- or "inapplicable, insufficient or 
doubtful with reference to the administration and settlement of matters"- the 
district court can proceed in any way that it deems right and proper. LC. § 15-8-
3 
102(2). TEDRA explicitly permits a party to have a judicial proceeding relating to 
any case or controversy arising under the statute. LC. § 15-8-201(b). TEDRA 
authorizes an action "incidental to an existing judicial proceeding" or as a new 
action. LC. § 15-8-202. The nonjudicial resolution process, or TEDRA Agreement 
process, is a supplement to, not a derogation from, the provisions authorized by 
statute or common law. LC. § 15-8-301. Parties to a TEDRA Agreement have an 
option to file the agreement with the court; however, filing is not required for the 
TEDRA Agreement to be binding and enforceable. LC.§ 15-8-303. 
TEDRA is silent as to the procedural enforcement of binding nonjudicial 
agreements, should a party believe such an agreement has been breached. LC. § 
15-8-101, et seq. Frizzell, pursuant to LC.§ 15-8-201(b) and LC.§ 15-8-202, filed 
a complaint to enforce the parties' TEDRA Agreement. The district court admitted 
that the TEDRA statute allows "for parties to seek enforcement of the TEDRA 
agreement by petition," but determined that Frizzell's complaint was not an 
appropriate "petition" in its ruling granting the De Youngs' motion to dismiss. 
Petition is not defined in the TEDRA Statute. LC. § 18-5-101, et seq. The 
statute permits a party to bring a new action, and a district court may consolidate 
that new action with the original action in exercise of its plenary powers. LC. § 15-
4 
8-202(3). Such consolidation is not required, as the legislature chose the word 
"may" over shall. Id Frizzell's complaint was a petition to the district court to 
enforce the TEDRA Agreement in the form of a complaint. 
2. Frizzell's complaint was a TEDRA complaint. 
Contrary to the De Youngs' assertions, Frizzell did not need the district court 
to "convert" his complaint "into a TEDRA cause of action"- it was a TEDRA 
cause of action. (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). The DeYoungs' (and the district 
court's) narrow view of Frizzell's complaint is misplaced. (Respondents' Brief, p. 
16). 
Idaho is a notice pleading state pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) (a complaint 
need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief'). As the De Youngs rightly note, a party is not 
"slavishly bound to stating particular theories" of law in its complaint. Seiniger 
Law Office, P.A. v. NPac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2009) 
(internal citations omitted). (Respondents' Brief, p. 17). Pleadings are to be 
liberally construed. Id A complaint is valid if the adverse party is put on notice of 
the claims being brought against it. Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dep 't, 139 
Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003). 
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"A complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief nor include a 
formal statement of the cause of action ... [but] there must be some indication of the 
theory of recovery." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 
1164, 1170 (2010) (italics in original). Brown is applicable, not as a bar to 
Frizzell's complaint but as a boost. As in Brown, the eagle eyes of a "hyper-
vigilant attorney" are not needed to see that the entirety of Frizzell's complaint 
falls squarely within the four comers of the TEDRA statute. Id. at 1171-1172. 
While Frizzell's complaint references damages as a remedy, the damages result 
from injuries suffered by Frizzell due to the De Youngs' administration of a trust 
and their breach of a TEDRA Agreement. 
In fact, the word "trust" appeared nine times in just the first nine paragraphs 
of the complaint. (R. 6-7). A full eleven paragraphs were devoted solely to the 
terms of the parties' TEDRA Agreement in the "Background" section of Frizzell's 
complaint. (R. 8-11 ). The Frizzell Trust and the TEDRA Agreement were 
appended to the complaint as exhibits. (R. 36-93, Exs. A & B). Each cause of 
action, save the twelfth of thirteen, enumerated facts and legal allegations related 
exclusively to the De Youngs' administration of the Trust pursuant to the Trust's 
6 
original terms and the TEDRA Agreement. (R. 11-34). 4 The acronym TEDRA 
appears on 17 of the complaint's 30 pages. (R. 6-35). Short of adding a flashing 
neon caption stating "TEDRA Complaint," or specific references to portions of the 
TEDRA statute, the De Youngs could not have had any more notice of the causes 
of action underlying Frizzell's complaint. 
All trust and estate disputes in Idaho are governed by TEDRA, i.e. the Trust 
and Estate Dispute Resolution Act. I.C. 15-8-101, et seq. Even if Frizzell had not 
referenced the "TEDRA Agreement" or the Frizzell trust explicitly- which he 
repeatedly did- the De Youngs would be put on notice that Frizzell 's complaint 
was a TEDRA action. It is either disingenuous or naive for the De Youngs' to assert 
that they did not know the complaint arose under the TEDRA statute. Either way, 
Frizzell satisfied Idaho's notice pleading requirements. 
3. Frizzell was permitted to file a complaint to enforce a 
contract, the TEDRA Agreement. 
A party to a contract can always seek judicial enforcement of the contract's 
terms by initiating a lawsuit in court with appropriate jurisdiction. A TEDRA 
Agreement is merely a settlement contract, which "stands on the same footing as 
4 The twelfth cause of action is for punitive damages, which reference's Edwin De Young's conduct, but unlike the 
other causes of action does not explicitly use the word "Trust" or the phrase "TEDRA Agreement." (R. 32). 
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any other contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are 
applicable to contracts generally." Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 
672, 249 P. 3d 857, 865 (2011). A TEDRA Agreement, or binding nonjudicial 
resolution, must be in writing and signed by all parties. LC. § 15-8-302. Once 
signed, the TEDRA Agreement is binding and conclusive upon all parties for the 
subject matter of the dispute. Id. The TEDRA Agreement is binding whether or not 
the parties thereto take the optional step to file it with the court. LC. § 15-8-303. 
Black's Law Dictionary, ninth edition, defines a contract as "an agreement 
between two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise 
recognizable at law." The Frizzell Trust TEDRA Agreement outlined the parties' 
agreement to modify the terms of the Frizzell Trust, compelled certain actions by 
Frizzell and the De Youngs, and defined its own breach. Specifically, "[ e Jach party 
agrees to do all acts and sign all documents necessary to carry out the terms and 
provisions of this Agreement and acknowledges that any failure to do so will be 
considered a breach of this Agreement." (R. 107). While the TEDRA Agreement 
did not identify a preferred enforcement mechanism or venue, it did provide for 
reimbursement and indemnification by the prevailing party for all costs and 
reasonable expenses "including without limitation court costs and reasonable 
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attorneys' fees." (R. 107). The explicit reference to "court costs" indicated the 
parties considered the possibility of litigation to enforce the TEDRA Agreement in 
the event of breach. 
The TEDRA Agreement did not reference or allude or outline any 
requirements for Frizzell and the De Youngs to seek additional, nonjudicial 
remedies nor did it defme how the parties should "petition" the court in addressing 
breaches. The Idaho legislature permits parties to pursue "an action upon any 
contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" within five 
years of breach. LC. 5-216. Frizzell pursued this action for breaches occurring after 
his execution of the TEDRA Agreement in October 2014, by initiating a lawsuit in 
2016. (R. 6). 
C. FRIZZELL DID NOT RELEASE DEYOUNG TO FREELY 
BREACH THE TEDRA AGREEMENT. 
The parties agreed that the TEDRA Agreement, like any other contract, must 
be construed as a whole, considering all parts. Salfeety v. Seidman (In re Estate of 
Kirk), 127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794 (1995). The DeYoungs and the district 
court concurred with Frizzell that "a court's primary objective is to discover the 
intent of the parties through viewing the document in its entirety." Bondy v. Levy, 
9 
121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P. 2d 1342 (1992). However, the district court and the 
De Youngs ignored key limiting language that appears repeatedly in the TEDRA 
Agreement, providing a limitation to the waiver and release contained therein. 
Instead, the De Youngs and the district court determined that Frizzell, and the 
express language of the TEDRA Agreement, permitted De Young to breach all his 
obligations under both the trust and the Agreement without limitation. 
It is true that both Frizzell and the De Youngs agreed to certain releases and 
indemnification language within the TEDRA Agreement. (R. 78-79, 115 .5-7; R. 
80-81, 19). However, those releases were not unlimited. The district court correctly 
noted that "[t]he parties executed the TEDRA agreement to resolve certain issues 
between the parties that had arisen prior to the execution of the TEDRA 
agreement, modify the trust, and subject resolution of Trust disputes to the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R. 163). A court must construe any 
agreement "so as to give force and effect to every part of the agreement." Palomo 
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 314,317,955 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1998). 
Paragraph nine of the agreement releases DeYoung from "any claims .. .in 
his capacity as Trustee that" Frizzell now, ever, "may have had, or may there after 
have from the inception of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust 
10 
and the OTIP Trust up to the date this Agreement is executed." (R. 80) 
(emphasis added). While the release included future claims ("may there after (sic) 
have"), the TEDRA Agreement limited the release of claims to those that Frizzell 
could have brought prior to the date the agreement was executed. By way of 
example, should Frizzell have discovered four months after he signed the TEDRA 
Agreement that De Young breached the terms of the original Trust in 2013, Frizzell 
would be barred from bringing claims related to that conduct. The TEDRA 
agreement barred claims that Frizzell knew about or should have known about that 
arose from conduct prior to the agreement's execution. The very next sentence in 
the TEDRA Agreement made that clear: "Such release is limited to claims that 
were asserted or could have been asserted ... " (R. 80) (emphasis added). 
The next paragraph releases Frizzell from claims that De Young "brought or 
could have brought" in the original 2009 litigation. (R. 80). Again, the release was 
limited to those claims "as of the date of execution of the Agreeement." (R. 81). 
The date of execution of the Agreement provided a bright line between past 
conduct (barred claims) and future conduct (permitted claims). 
The district court and the De Youngs ignored repeated temporal limitation 
language ("as of the date of the agreement") and the express release limitation 
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("claims that were asserted or could have been asserted . .. "), and instead, construed 
the agreement as Frizzell's acquiescence to De Youngs' carte blanche breach of the 
TEDRA Agreement. Removing those clear, unambiguous limitations changed the 
parties' express written intent. 
Frizzell waived his right to relitigate claims he had already asserted or could 
have asserted in the 2009 litigation up October 27, 2014. (R. 83). Frizzell did not 
waive his right to litigate De Youngs' fiduciary breaches of the express terms of 
TEDRA Agreement. Had any of Frizzell's allegations concerned conduct prior to 
October 27, 2014, those properly could have been dismissed by the clear language 
of the TEDRA Agreement. However, the conduct alleged in Frizzell's complaint 
occurred after the execution of the agreement and related to De Youngs' agreed to 
duties delineated in the agreement. The dismissal of those claims by the district 
court was improper, as it rendered portions of the parties' TEDRA Agreement 
meaningless. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Neither the De Youngs nor the district court presented sufficient legal 
reasons to dismiss Frizzell's complaint. Facing a TEDRA complaint, governed by 
a broadly construed statute with explicit reference to the court's plenary powers to 
12 
fashion trust dispute remedies, the district court simply declined to fashion any 
remedy. The district court could have: (1) deny the motion to dismiss and permit 
Frizzell the opportunity to prove or disprove his allegations through discovery and 
motion practice; (2) deny the motion and direct Frizzell to amend his complaint; 
(3) deny the motion and seek contempt remedies against the De Youngs; ( 4) deny 
the motion and consolidate the new case with the 2009 action; or ( 5) deny the 
motion and direct the parties to amend their TEDRA Agreement. Instead, the 
district court granted the motion to dismiss by altering the specific terms of the 
TEDRA Agreement. 
The district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. This Court must 
reverse the district court's decision and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
This Court should also grant Frizzell his reasonable attorneys' fees in conjunction 
with this appeal. 
"){~ 
DATED this :2_ day of September, 2017. 
?'tR<}~Jl k ·'J'.i:aynes, ISB #8425 
/ Attorneys for Appellant 
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